Inwagen -is unsuccessful. where → is entailment, P 0 is a true proposition describing the complete state of the universe at some time in the distant past, L is the conjunction of all the laws of nature, P is a proposition "describing any occurrence after the time at which the state described by P 0 held" (526), and S is any arbitrarily chosen person.
Assumption (1) is a statement of determinism, and the conclusion (5) states that, for any S and P, no matter what S does, P. In other words, the conclusion of the argument is that whatever will be will be -no matter what anybody does. Granting that this is incompatible with anyone having free will, the argument, if sound, establishes that free will and determinism are incompatible.
Huemer argues (in section 1.2) that rule α* and rule β* are equivalent to van
Inwagen's rule α and rule β, 3 and that, given his reading of 'N', those rules are valid (section 4). All well and good. The question I am concerned with, and the question Huemer addresses in section 5 of his paper, is whether or not, on his interpretation of 'N', premises (2) and (3) withstand Lewis's attack on the Consequence Argument.
Assuming that Huemer's version of the Consequence Argument is valid, in order to escape its conclusion the traditional compatibilist 4 has to deny at least one of premises (2) and (3): she has to claim either that we can "do something about" the past or that we can do something about the laws (or both). According to Lewis, premise (3) is false: deterministic agents can "do something about" the laws. Lewis argues that there is a harmless sense in which we can do something about the laws ("render the laws of nature false in the weak sense", in his terminology) -a sense that survives van Inwagen's arguments to the contrary, since van Inwagen establishes only the uncontroversial claim that we cannot render the laws of nature false in a "strong" sense.
Huemer notes that Lewis denies premise (3), but does not attempt to meet Lewis's objection to that premise. Rather, Huemer concentrates on defending premise (2) More generally, Lewis claims that there are some acts that he is able to perform (raise his hand, for example), such that, were he to perform any of them, L would be false. This claim follows from the particular claim -that he is able to raise his hand -together with his analysis of counterfactuals. Given determinism, the closest possible world where Lewis raises his hand must be a world where either facts about the very distant past are different or the laws of nature are different (or both). But on his analysis of counterfactuals, a minor violation of laws counts against closeness less than does a difference in facts throughout the whole of the past. Hence, the closest world where he raises his hand will be one whose past matches the actual world's past until fairly close to the relevant time, whereupon a "divergence miracle" -a violation of the actual laws -occurs, enabling him to raise his hand at that world. 5 Lewis denies, however, that the act of hand-raising would itself be a miracle: he denies that we are able to perform such "law-breaking acts". Rather, the violation of the actual laws would occur slightly before the hand-raising. To see the distinction clearly, we need to get our time-indexing straight. We can distinguish two theses, each of which entails (WT) -the thesis to which Lewis explicitly subscribes.
(WT1) For some times t 1 and t 2 , where t 2 ≥ t 1 , and for some non-actual act A: I am able, at t 1 , to do A at t 2 , and, were I to do A at t 2 , a law would have been broken prior to t 2 (and hence the past-relative-to-t 2 would have been different).
(WT2) For some times t 1 and t 2 , where t 2 ≥ t 1 , and for some non-actual act A: I am able, at t 1 , to do A at t 2 , and, were I to do A at t 2 , a law would have been broken prior to t 1 (and hence the past-relative-to-t 1 would have been different).
Lewis holds (WT1): I am able to do something A such that, were I to do it, a law would have been broken prior to the time of A. But nothing he says suggests that he holds (WT2). A Lewis-style compatibilist need not be committed to the claim that there is ever a time t such that any deterministic agent is able, at t, to perform an act A at or after t, such that were they to do A, the past relative to t would be different to the actual past relative to t.
Huemer may well be right that "if, in order for me to do A, something would have to have happened five minutes ago (or a year ago, or five seconds ago, or whatever) that did not in fact occur, then I cannot now do A". If he is right, then (WT2) is indeed false. But the Lewis-style compatibilist need not (and probably should not) be committed to (WT2). So
Huemer's attempt to show that (WT2) is false does nothing to undermine Lewis's position.
Consider an example Huemer uses to motivate the thesis he is trying to establish:
Suppose that you are a doctor in the emergency room of a hospital, where a heart attack victim has just been brought in. Suppose you know, as a matter of the laws of biochemistry and the physiology of the human body, that in order for a heart attack patient to be revived, CPR must be administered within three minutes of the time of the heart attack. Suppose you also know that for this patient, four minutes have already elapsed, during which the patient did not receive CPR. You would obviously be correct to conclude that, at this point, you cannot revive the patient. (542) The Lewis-style compatibilist can accept all this. All it shows is that (WT2) is false.
But this leaves the status of (WT1) unchallenged. Suppose you, as the imagined doctor, know that for this patient, two minutes have already elapsed, during which the patient did not receive CPR. Then you would be incorrect to conclude that, at this point, you cannot revive the patient. (It might, of course, be true that you cannot revive the patient. But it would be wrong -not to mention criminally negligent -of you to infer it from the information just given.)
According to any sensible theory of abilities, the question of whether you have the ability at t 1 to perform some act A at some later time, t 2 , depends on what the circumstances are at t 1 . The ability to perform A at t 2 is an ability that one might have at earlier times, but subsequently lose as time progresses. As a feigned Lewis-style compatibilist, I hold that even if determinism is true, I was probably -that is to say, so far as I know -able, when I was twelve years old, to become a surgeon by the age of thirty. By the time I was, say, twentyfive, I had lost that ability: circumstances were such that I could not possibly complete the required training quickly enough. By the time I was twenty-five (at time t), in order to become a surgeon by the age of thirty, the past (relative to t) would have to have been different. So I was not able, at t, to become a surgeon by the age of thirty. And, being now over the age of thirty, I am certainly unable now to (have) become a surgeon by the age of thirty.
According to incompatibilists, if determinism is true we are never able to do otherwise than what we actually do. So according to the incompatibilist, assuming determinism, I never had the ability to become a surgeon by the age of thirty -not even when I was twelve. The Lewis-style compatibilist only needs to hold (WT1) in order to avoid this alleged consequence of determinism: she only needs to hold that there was a time (when I was twelve, say) such that I was able, at that time, to bring things about after that time that would have resulted in my becoming a surgeon by the age of thirty. She need not additionally hold that I was able at the age of twenty-five, say, to become a surgeon by the age of thirty; that is, she need not hold (WT2 Premise (2) of the Consequence Argument -N S P 0 -says, "no matter what we do, P 0 ", which in turn cashes out as "P 0 , and for each action A that S can perform, if S were to perform A, it would still be the case that P 0 ". P 0 is a true proposition describing the complete state of the universe at some time in the past (indeed, the distant past). If we were to read 'past' here as 'past relative to A' -and drop the 'distant' -we would indeed have a premise that the Lewis-style compatibilist would deny. But such a premise would presuppose the fixity of the future, which is just what the Consequence Argument is supposed to establish (assuming determinism). 
